
Based on a presentation by Nancy L. Ruther, Title VI 50th Anniversary Conference, Washington, DC, March 19, 2009

Abstract

From 1958-1988, federal legislative goals aimed at creating and sustaining capacity within the US higher education system to provide international, regional and language expertise and experts for the country. This study focuses on the impact of two key federal programs on the overall higher education system of over 3000 institutions. Focused on Title VI, as a domestic program implemented by the Department of Education, it provides a contrasting case of the main university-based foreign affairs program implemented by the Agency for International Development. It shows clearly that Title VI succeeded strongly in sustaining and diffusing international capacity across all levels of the higher education system while the much better funded AID programs did not. It also shows how Title VI absorbed the goals of the never-funded but ambitious International Education Act of 1966 that attempted to merge foreign affairs and domestic programs. It explains the paradoxically positive effects on Title VI, after its near death experience in 1971, of expanding goals and constituencies straining against steady if very low funding. It asserts that Title VI became the core operational model of the federal international higher education policy arena, solidified through the trajectory of these three programs.

Note: The graphs in this paper are labeled with two numbers – a figure number for this paper and the original figure number in Ruther, 2002.

While the author takes full responsibility for any errors or omissions, she gratefully acknowledges the skill and insight of John-Michael Arnold, a graduate student in International Relations at Yale, who helped to organize and synthesize the conference presentation and this post-conference document.
**Key question addressed**

*How has the recent history of the federal relationship with higher education affected the institutional capacity of the US higher education system to sustain and expand its international dimension, to internationalize?*

**Focus of the paper -- three federal programs**

- **Main focus:** Title VI of the National Defense Higher Education Act (NDEA) of 1958, based in the domestic legislative stream.
- **Counter-point:** Agency for International Development (AID) programs with universities, based in the foreign assistance legislative stream.
- **The path not taken:** The International Education Act of 1966, though never funded, aimed to channel both domestic and foreign assistance streams into a single robust federal program working through universities and the entire education sector.

**The higher education policy arena**

Conceptually, a public policy arena comprises an “iron triangle” of the executive, the legislature and citizens-clients, i.e, the universities themselves in the case of higher education policy. All sides of the triangle recognize a stable core of policy issues as legitimate for national action to achieve a set of broad goals and worthy of regular on-going funding albeit at varying levels. The United States higher education policy arena developed over the history of the republic, responding to both international and domestic policy needs. Six overarching substantive interests became legitimate goals of federal higher education policy, thereby defining the policy arena. The six goals that have been legitimate reasons for federal support have been to enable higher education to:

1. Provide unique and high level knowledge and trained citizens, expertise broadly writ, in the economic, scientific, defense and political spheres.
2. Provide leadership and meet national needs for national security and defense preparedness.
3. Provide leadership and help meet national needs economic security and enhance competitiveness, both domestically and internationally.
4. Serve as a major source of social and economic mobility for US citizens, as instrumental to major goals of national productivity and social justice.
5. Provide leadership and training to promote and support international understanding.
6. Serve as a major source for the creation of an informed, competent and competitive citizenry.

While these six broad goals have defined the overall higher education policy arena in the United States, a separate and more specifically targeted international higher education policy arena really developed after World War Two. The Soviet launch of Sputnik was a key catalyst, with the resultant National Defense Education Act and its legislative trajectory coming to form the core of the international higher education policy arena. As we shall see, the primary goals accepted as part of the international higher education policy arena constituted a sub-set of the broader goals of the higher education policy arena. Focusing on the international dimensions of the six broader higher education policy goals put this international policy arena uncomfortably but squarely at the cross-roads of domestic and foreign affairs legislative oversight and funding committees and their parallels in the executive implementing agencies. This paper argues that this international higher education policy arena was structured and solidified through the trajectory of the three programs and that Title VI became the operational model at its core.

**Internationalization of the higher education system**

We are concerned with internationalization of the higher education system, rather than of individual institutions. In describing what is meant by internationalization, it is useful to draw upon the work of Henson who developed an index score for the degree of university internationalization. Figure 1 is adapted from this work and provides a tool for measuring the movement of institutions along the internationalization path.

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Figure 1: Internationalization dynamics of the higher education system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lower degree of internationalization</th>
<th>Higher degree of internationalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Leadership and Management</td>
<td>1) Leadership strong at all levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Leadership support nascent to some degree</td>
<td>• Resources match rhetoric, serious long-term commitment to international elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Resources do not match rhetoric, sporadic support to obtain external funding</td>
<td>• International as regular part of planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Little information for planning</td>
<td>• Neutral to supportive faculty policies for overseas work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Disincentives in faculty policies for overseas work</td>
<td>• Strong or multiple links with national associations' international offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Few or weak links with national associations' international offices</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Organization</td>
<td>2) Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Office of foreign students plus pressure from some other program units pro-international</td>
<td>• Multiple linked offices or strong central office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Weak links among interested parties</td>
<td>• Interested parties linked across campus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Little support in organizational culture</td>
<td>• Supportive organizational culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Institutional member of NAFSA, other international associations limited to individual memberships on campus</td>
<td>• Institutional member of NAFSA and other internationally focused consortia, associations and groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Program Activities</td>
<td>3) Program Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Some international and area courses in social sciences/humanities; minors maybe</td>
<td>• Variety of international degrees offered: BA to Ph.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Some foreign languages offered but not required; most common ones</td>
<td>• Many foreign languages offered and/or required; enrollments rising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Growing number of overseas students but few U.S. students involved in study abroad</td>
<td>• Regular movement of U.S. and overseas students including graduate research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Occasional faculty travel overseas but infrequent visiting scholars from overseas</td>
<td>• Regular movement of faculty from and to overseas for teaching and research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Some development cooperation but not linked to other campus activity</td>
<td>• Multi-disciplinary research/teaching in area &amp; global themes &amp; languages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Public service clientele hostile or disinterested to international programming</td>
<td>• Development cooperation linked to other academic program activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Resources</td>
<td>4) Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Administrators supportive, little flexibility</td>
<td>• Administrators active, articulate, flexible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Faculty with international capacity limited, few with interest in international teaching/research</td>
<td>• Faculty core internationally competent, many interested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Funds limited for international activity</td>
<td>• Pro-international incentive funds available through internal competitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Few external grants beyond development cooperation</td>
<td>• Frequent external funds from many sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Library with few international books or journals; virtually all English materials</td>
<td>• Library collection with regional/theme focus and non-English materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) External Environment</td>
<td>5) External Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Little demand from stakeholders and clients</td>
<td>• Strong demand by stakeholders and key clients for international programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Weak links between pro-international elements on and off campus</td>
<td>• Strong links between pro-international elements off and on campus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• National association tepid or newly aware</td>
<td>• National institutional association active pro-internationalization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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In describing the internationalization of the system one must consider all five elements – both academic and institutional – outlined in figure 1. Since Henson’s original index score focused upon the internationalization of individual institutions, it did not consider the system-level elements of internationalization, such as the communication processes and networks which are important to system-wide change. Given this paper’s focus upon the system, a system-linking variable was added using the membership and leadership roles in disciplinary and institutional higher education associations. There is a spectrum to the degree of internationalization, as described by the lower and higher degrees postulated in the table.

**Variables for analyzing federal effect on internationalization**

The two primary variables used to analyze the federal programs’ effects on the international capacity of the higher education system are:

- **Sustainability**: reflected in the institutionalization, persistence and vitality of a federal program across the system.
- **Diffusion**: concerns the transmission and communication of a program across the system.

Use of these two variables reflects the assumption that for an innovation to be successful, mere adoption by institutions within the system is not enough. Rather, innovation must be *sustained* and *spread* to a critical mass of institutions.

In setting out the conditions for sustainability, I draw upon the two conditions cited by Levine in his classic study of how to avoid failure in higher education change efforts:\(^3\):

- **Compatibility**: a “measure of the appropriateness of an innovation within existing organizational boundaries.” Levine also described it as the degree to which an innovation is consistent with the norms, values and goals of an organization. Compatibility is particularly key to the faculty elements of a university.
- **Profitability**: Levine saw profitability as a measure of satisfaction. It describes the degree to which institutions perceive the “value” of an innovation. “Value” is particularly key to acceptance by the administrative elements of a university.

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Turning to the conditions for diffusion, drawing on the work of Clark, two mechanisms for promoting the transmission of innovation are important:

- **Emulation effect**: The perceived quality and prestige of an innovation leads other institutions to emulate it. National associations are potentially important for sharing innovations. The emergence of a perceived “gold standard” is a key driver of emulation.

- **Traegerin effect** describes the phenomenon of young faculty and other “boundary-spanners” carrying ideas and *modi operandi* with them when moving to new universities. Doctoral students are a particularly important vehicle for the carrying of new ideas.

To sum up, in analyzing the effect of federal programs upon the international capacity of the higher education system, i.e., to internationalize, we are looking for evidence of both **sustainability and diffusion**. For each of these, we have set out the conditions and mechanisms by which they operate. The following assumptions are made for the purposes of the analysis:

a. Stable participation by institutions over time reflects a program’s sustainability.

b. The more categories of institutions participating in a program, the higher the level of diffusion across the system.

c. The higher the participation rate of research and doctoral universities in a program, the greater the impact on diffusion due to emulation and traegerin effects.

**The historical development of the international higher education policy arena**

Between 1958 and 1964, the educational and foreign assistance policy streams ran in parallel. Stream evokes the sense of forward movement within known but somewhat movable boundaries. At critical junctures, streams may shift beds or converge for natural reasons or by overwhelming outside force. So too, with policy streams.

**Educational policy stream**

President Eisenhower and the Republican Party had in fact taken a position against federal involvement in education during the 1955 election campaign, supported by many university presidents. That stance was reversed with the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957 and its

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implications for US national security. In response, the Administration sent draft legislation to Congress which was to eventually become the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958.

The final version of the NDEA had eight substantive titles, with Title VI entitled “Language Development,” being the primary title supportive of universities’ nascent international dimension. The NDEA goals were clearly to enhance national security with science and education as core implementing pillars. Title VI consisted of three substantive sections:

- **Section 601a**: encouraged higher education institutions to establish centers for teaching languages and area studies.
- **Section 601b**: authorized fellowships for language training.
- **Section 602**: authorized research and studies to specify need for language training and related fields.

To understand the operation of the Title VI program, it is useful to think about a nascent policy arena with a triangle comprising Congress, the Executive and higher education institutions themselves. Thinking in these terms, consider concrete areas of legislative objectives; implementation mechanisms; and campus priorities respectively.

The legislative objectives of the Title VI program, apparent since 1959, were three-fold:

1. Specialized knowledge creation and teaching in language and area studies
2. Expertise for national needs in language and area studies
3. Diffusion of expert knowledge in language and area studies

The legislative goals of the Title VI program targeted a sub-set of the goals of the broader higher education policy arena as described above.

The Executive branch used three basic implementation mechanisms to channel funding to the higher education system, all highly compatible with higher education norms and operating procedures:

1. Competitive, peer-reviewed grants to institutions to enhance institutional capacity for interdisciplinary language and area studies.
2. Fellowships to institutions: it should be noted that in addition to supporting direct training, these were also a mechanism for attracting the best students to institutions. NB. The federal norm at the time with programs like the GI Bill and Fulbright, and even more acutely since, has been to give fellowships and grants directly to students and not to the institution to re-award to students.
3. Competitive, peer-reviewed grants to individuals for research in the pursuit of new knowledge in support of language and area studies.

Turning to the nature of the implementing agency itself, during the initial years of Title VI, very strong executive leadership was its hallmark. Title VI was a “crown jewel” managed at the highest levels of the Department of Education, with the Deputy Secretary working closely with his opposite numbers, particularly in AID and State. Over time, Title VI fell out of the crown and its direct administration slowly descended down the ranks, moving farther and farther from the policy level. This weakening of the implementing agency was offset, at least in part, by stronger client (that is, institutional) advocacy from higher education and on-going if low level support in the legislative branch, particularly in the appropriations committees.

The client or universities themselves as the third side of the triangle, experienced fairly consistent competitive priorities to compete for the Title VI grants and fellowships including:

1. Institutional capacity: as demonstrated in depth of faculty, curriculum strength, the number and types of languages offered, strength of enrollments, etc.
2. Institutional commitment: among other items, primacy fell to the extent of financial “leverage,” that is the ratio of an institution’s money invested relative to the funding received from Title VI.
3. The number of students trained and taking up jobs and careers working in the Title VI relevant fields.

**Foreign assistance stream**

From 1949 onwards, US universities, especially land-grant colleges and universities, became involved in the provision of technical assistance in developing countries. The *Foreign Assistance Act (FAA)* of 1961 provided a broad legislative framework for these federal-university relationships which had been developing on an ad-hoc basis. It replaced the International Cooperation Agency (ICA) with the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) as a new agency in the State Department. The FAA’s strength was an expansion in the level of foreign assistance provided to Africa and Latin America. Its role with the higher education on the home front was narrow but robust initially but it also began a downward slide over time. The collaboration of high level AID officials with the Deputy Secretary of Education and high level university representatives was extraordinary and provided a very solid frame for the emerging
policy arena around international higher education. Indeed, it produced a very heady brew in the early years on campuses that won both AID and NDEA funding, e.g., Wisconsin with the Land Tenure Center and many Title VI centers. From the outset, in comparison with the NDEA, the FAA was much higher per university. On the negative side, the FAA goal focus related to higher education was less specific, more instrumental than fundamental regarding higher education. This also left AID a weaker implementing agency vis a vis the universities, more dependent on personal good will of its leadership rather than legislative mandate. Finally, the primary AID program implementation mechanism was contracting rather than peer review competitive grants, which was less compatible both with the norms and the operating structures of higher education.

**Attempt to merge the educational and foreign assistance streams**

Between 1965 and 1970, after having run in parallel until 1964, there was an attempt to merge the educational and foreign assistance streams into a single channel for the nascent international higher education policy arena. The policy was crystallized through three speeches of President Johnson in 1965 and 1966. Two primary pledges emerged:

- Long term commitment to American universities for international studies support; and
- Assisting the education effort of developing nations at all levels.

These commitments gave rise to the *International Education Act (IEA)* of 1966, which was ultimately signed by President Johnson on 29 October 1966. The “iron triangle” of the nascent policy arena seemed to be made of steel so strong with support of a powerful advocacy group in the universities, good coalitions within the legislature and strong support in the executive branch, particularly in the Department of Education and the State Department. The 3 goals embodied in the IEA may be summarized as follows:

- International expertise for foreign affairs and education at all levels
- Humanitarian assistance overseas including the education sector
- Citizen education to better understand and work with the rest of the world.

The attempt to merge the educational and foreign assistance policy streams is clear from the combination of the goals of the Title VI program (international expertise) with the objectives of the AID programs (humanitarian assistance). The addition of citizen education implied broadening the Act’s reach to the whole of society, rather than just limiting the focus to the
creation of experts and expertise. Indeed, the IEA attempted to expand the goals of the international higher education policy arena beyond those of the NDEA, so that the international higher education policy arena would encompass all 6 goals normally covered within the higher education policy arena and even reaching out to add an international dimension to the policy arena for pre-collegiate education. For example, the promotion of citizen education implied the objective of an informed citizenry – objective 6 of the higher education policy arena – whilst the aim of humanitarian assistance overseas reflected the adoption of the social justice objective. That the goals of the IEA were ambitious is emphasized by the fact that the authorization for IEA expenditure soared quite high, targeting funding levels almost six times the level of Title VI authorizations in 1969 as seen in figures to follow.

**Still-birth of the IEA and near death of Title VI**

In the November 1966 Congressional elections, forty-seven new Republicans were elected to the House of Representatives. Due to the late passage of the IEA in the previous session, its appropriations were left to the incoming Congress. Consideration of the political context in which those appropriations were debated is crucial. Foreign aid budgets were slashed to the lowest level since 1958, partly in a reflection of congressional disapproval over the Vietnam War policy. Congressional displeasure with campus unrest placed pressure upon higher education budgets. Education policy generally was becoming more tense as a consequence of desegregation efforts. The war and the Great Society programs also exacerbated fiscal constraints.

In the congressional session of fall 1968, the Johnson administration did successfully secure passage of the Higher Education Amendments extending authorizations for their overall programs until June 30, 1971 including the IEA. Although the IEA was authorized, it was never actually funded by Congress. By 1976, the IEA was completely dead. It was the last year that an authorization was even attempted.

In 1971, Title VI also was under direct threat. The Nixon Administration attempted to “zero-out” funding for Title VI. University and congressional supporters fought and preserved it but at substantially lower funding levels. Over time, champions in Congress continued attempts to re-build and even grow the Title VI program. These developments are well-illustrated by figure 2, which shows the authorizations and appropriations for Title VI, as well as the
authorizations for the IEA, over the period 1959 to 1986. Authorizations describe “aspirational” funding levels, i.e., funding levels deemed necessary to fulfill the law’s full goals and legislators’ aspirations for it. Appropriations refer to the level of funding actually approved, normally by different legislative committees than the authorizing committees.

Figure 2: Authorizations versus appropriations – NDEA/HEA Title VI and IEA (1959-86)\(^5\)

The ambitious goals of the IEA are apparent from the scale of its authorizations in 1969, approximately 6 times the level of Title VI authorizations. The Nixon Administration’s attempt to zero-out Title VI is clear from the decrease in appropriations for the program in 1971; the scale of these funding cuts is emphasized by the fact that the decrease in 1971 was over one-third of the level of appropriations in 1970. However, as noted, Congress continued its efforts to grow Title VI, which is shown by the growth in the program’s authorizations between 1969 and 1974. The continuation of high levels of Title VI authorizations through the remainder of the 1970s reflects the fact that the aspirations of the IEA lived on beyond its death in 1976, a theme to which we will return.

The top line shows that the number of centers funded by Title VI dropped precipitously in the 1973-75 cycle after the 1971 funding cut. The bottom three lines show declines in all participants, including research universities and ‘doctoral, comprehensive and 4-year institutions’ all decreased substantially between the 1970-72 and 1973-75 periods. The number of centers grew slowly through the 1970s while the number of research universities stabilized. However, the ‘doctoral, comprehensive and 4-year’ institutions as solo grantees had essentially withdrawn from the program. By the end of the decade, only one remained (San Diego State University was the miracle child!). At the same time, the formation of consortia reflected a defensive strategy on the part of institutions that enabled them to persist in the program.

The aspirations of the IEA lived on

Despite the end of the IEA by 1976, many of its aspirations were carried into authorizations for Title VI and re-born as new programs within Title VI. Figure 2 shows Title VI authorizations growing throughout the 1970s as the dream of the IEA was more and more clearly dying and then in the late 1970s when it actually died. The slow growth of the number of Title VI centers confirms that it was the core of the Title VI program model. The embodiment of the larger aspirations generated with the IEA was particularly evident in the creation of new programs within Title VI as demonstrated in figure 4:

• International Studies/Graduate (IS/Grad) program focused on professional schools’ foreign language and area capacity;
• International Studies/Undergraduate (IS/Undergrad) program aimed at citizen education capacity with a focus on 4 year and two year colleges;
• International Business (Intl/Business) program aimed at business education capacity with a focus on 4 year and two years colleges and;
• Outreach to schools (where the funding was channeled into the Title VI Centers program, rather than being given directly to schools).

Figure 4: The broadening goals of Title VI\(^7\)

It is clear from figure 4 that the absolute level of federal appropriations to the centers was higher by the 1980s than it had been in 1976 when the IEA died. However, figure 4 also makes clear the decrease in appropriations for centers which occurred between 1978 and 1979. This decrease reflected the broadening goals of Title VI. Centers held steady or dropped off in order to create the IS/Undergrad program. Centers real funding was steady but they were required to include outreach to the broader education system, effectively reducing funding available for other program items. Essentially, funding to create expertise was channeled into meeting the goal of citizen education. Put differently, the goals of the international higher education policy

\(^7\) Source: Ruther, 2002, Page 167.
arena were expanding to encompass some of those – such as an informed citizenry and economic competitiveness – which existed within the broader higher education policy arena but which had not previously appeared within the international higher education arena. It helped to stabilize the new arena, providing new constituents and supporters for Title VI. But at what cost to overall goal achievement and program effectiveness for building the international institutional capacity of higher education?

**Evaluation of sustainability and diffusion results**

Let us move now to evaluate the extent of sustainability and diffusion of the Title VI and AID programs on higher education’s overall international capacity in the US. Together, the programs reached approximately 14 percent of the higher education system. There was a fairly equitable regional distribution of programs and resources, as well as a fairly even distribution of ownership between the public and private sectors. The institutional diversity was skewed towards the research and doctoral universities. These results are demonstrated in the graphs which follow.

**Figure 5: The geographic distribution of grantees**

![Figure 5: The geographic distribution of grantees](source: Ruther, 2002, Page 175.)

As shown, of the institutions participating in either of the Title VI or AID programs – at one time or another – there was a fair degree of balance in their geographic distribution.

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8 Source: Ruther, 2002, Page 175.
However, looking at the level of total resources allocated, figure 6 makes clear that Title VI was more heavily weighted towards the North-East and Mid-West.

**Figure 6**: The geographic distribution of funds in the Title VI and AID programs

![Figure 6.5: Regional funds distribution](image)

**Figure 7**: The ownership of grantees by program

![Figure 6.7 Ownership of grantees by program](image)

Figure 7 shows that the ratio of public Title VI grantees to private guarantees was 54.6 percent to 36.2 percent respectively, with the remainder being under mixed ownership. By

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10 Source: Ruther, 2002, Page 177.
In contrast, the ratio of public AID grantees to private grantees was 63.9 percent to 32.9 percent. In terms of resources, the skew of AID towards public institutions was even more pronounced.

Figure 8 compares the institutional diversity of grantees – of both the Title VI and AID programs – with that of the overall higher education system. For example, the graph shows that 18.5 percent of the 506 grantees (of both the Title VI and AID programs) in the study were research universities, while these universities accounted for only 3.5 percent of the entire system (in 1976, which is used as the base year).

Figure 8: Institutional diversity of Title VI and AID grantees

![Figure 7.11: Institutional diversity--study grantees by group versus system wide groups](image)

It is clear that every part of the higher education system participated in the programs. However, the particularly high representation of the research and doctoral universities is apparent from the fact that they constituted a considerably higher proportion of the grantees than they would in the higher education system as a whole.

**AID as a counterpoint**

For the purposes of analysis, it is now necessary to explicitly consider the AID program as a counterpoint to Title VI. Figure 9 shows the distribution of program funds – for both Title VI and AID – beyond the group of research universities.
Figure 9: The distribution of program funds beyond the group of research universities\textsuperscript{11}

Figure 6.13: Distribution of program funds beyond the research universities group

Figure 9 demonstrates how the doctoral, comprehensive, consortia and four-year institutions received more funding from the AID program compared to Title VI by factors of 14.8, 10.6, 9.4 and 3.3 respectively.

The fact that institutions received considerably more funding from AID gives rise to a crucial question: why was it that Title VI was more successful in sustaining and diffusing international capacity?

Beginning with AID, a number of weaknesses can be identified with the program in comparison to Title VI:

- Although high funding levels compared to Title VI would suggest strong profitability, \textbf{low compatibility in fact undercut profitability}. The goals of the program focused narrowly and tightly on technical expertise and the operating mechanisms were aligned poorly with higher education. The result was that the programs were compatible for only a small range of institutions (or consortia that spread the high operational costs).
- There was a lack of peer-review selection methods.

\textsuperscript{11} Source: Ruther, 2002, Page 182.
Weak legislative oversight meant that operations were largely left to the discretion of implementing officials.

By contrast, key reasons for the high sustainability and diffusion of Title VI included:

- The program was highly compatible with higher education due to the existence of peer review, flexible implementation methods and a depth and breadth of resources (as provided through Centers).
- The continuity of funding, admittedly perversely low, with fairly stable implementation patterns provided institutions with a fairly high degree of profitability, in the sense of perceived and relative value.
- The Fellowships from the Title VI program supported the training of doctoral students which contributed to diffusion through the *tragerin* effect.
- The newer programs added from 1972 onwards placed emphasize upon outward diffusion and garnered new constituencies, particularly amongst the 2- and 4-year universities as well as comprehensive institutions.
- The research universities were the largest group of grantees which contributed to emulation effects.
- The availability of limited funding for the program contributed to exclusivity, which helped to establish it as the “gold standard”.
- **Title VI became the only game in town:** with the IEA gone after 1976, and the AID program narrowing and shrinking in funding, the very fact that Title VI was available enhanced its perceived value to higher education institutions, thereby enhancing its profitability.

**Barely there, powerfully present**

Despite its low level of funding, the Title VI program has come to anchor the international higher education policy arena in the US. Its flexibility, elasticity and comprehensiveness have allowed it to address, if not entirely fulfill, the high goals bequeathed by the International Education Act.
The chronic underfunding and hollowing out of the implementing agency meant that Title VI was **barely there**. In spite of this, it was also **powerfully present**. Title VI has played a powerful role in building, sustaining and extending higher education’s international capacity, institutionally and academically. Graduates from Title VI programs have seeded internationalist faculty across the entire higher education system. The program has provided both experts and expertise. It has helped to meet “citizen education” needs with outreach and growing undergraduate programs.

**Addendum based on commentary at the conference**

The research which formed the basis of this paper was concluded in 1988. After that date there were at least two significant structural shifts relevant to the role of the Title VI program as the anchor of the international higher education policy arena. The Centers for International Business Education and Research (CIBER) program was introduced into the Title VI umbrella through a legislative initiative sponsored and funding through authorizing and funding legislation of the Department of Commerce. The fact that this was introduced into the Title VI umbrella itself was a testament to the success of the “Centers model” of Title VI. It also reflected a deepening of the Title VI beyond the tiny undergraduate IS-Business program to robustly incorporate the economic security and competitiveness goal. With it, the international higher education policy arena strengthened its response to another existing goal of the broader higher education policy arena.

The other key structural shift was the creation of the National Security Education Program (NSEP, known as the Boren program, in 1992. This program was based in the Defense Department, rather than coming under the Title VI umbrella, because of a budgetary rule which prohibited shifting funds from the foreign affairs accounts to the domestic affairs accounts in order to impose fiscal discipline and fend off increasing federal deficits. Even so, the Boren program adopted a key element of the Title VI program, namely the fellowships mechanism to promote language and area studies expertise. Once again, this was a reflection of the extent to which Title VI had produced a stable policy arena and a workable program model. The Boren program was well-aligned with Title VI but separate. Though administered by a different implementing agency, it could also be described as an ‘adjunct’ to Title VI, certainly drawing on Title VI campus strengths and students.
During the question and answer session at the *Title VI 50th Anniversary Conference*, it was asked whether it would not be possible to fulfill all of the objectives of the IEA today. As noted earlier, the aspirations of the IEA were never in doubt. The limiting constraints upon fulfilling those aspirations were a lack of political will to build a whole new river system from the two main streams and also to allocate adequate financial resources for such major new programmatic water works. While the IEA over-reached and foundered, it left its mark on the international higher education policy arena. Clearly, many of its goals found a niche, if not a robust home, in the Title VI program. The IEA itself went well beyond the tolerances of the time for the international higher education policy arena. Yet it provided the seeds of new programs and helped to stretch the boundaries and actually expanded the limits for the policy arena. The core goals embodied in Title VI continued to be national security and expertise. However, after the IEA, other goals of the broader higher education policy arena – such as citizen education and economic security – were incorporated as legitimate if adjacent parts of the international higher education policy arena. It may be possible to incorporate the larger education goals of the IEA to bring higher and pre-collegiate education together with substantial new funding and programs of the federal policy arena. It seems highly unlikely that the IEA’s overseas development aspirations, so tied to foreign affairs and non-profit organizations and businesses like consulting firms, could possibly be re-integrated into any kind of education policy arena of the US government.

**Suggested relevant reading**


